Legal Basis For Precluding a Patent Examiner From Testifying by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 42 | Issue 2 Article 4
Winter 1967
Legal Basis For Precluding a Patent Examiner From
Testifying
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1967) "Legal Basis For Precluding a Patent Examiner From Testifying," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 42 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol42/iss2/4
LEGAL BASIS FOR PRECLUDING
A PATENT EXAMINER FROM TESTIFYING
In patent litigation it is almost unheard of for a litigant to seek
either the testimony or the deposition of a primary patent examiner. The
patent examiner should be as well informed of the disclosure and speci-
fication of a patent and as unbiased as any expert witness in a patent suit.
He studies the specification and the claims of the application,1 researches
the state of the prior art,2 conducts interviews with applicants,' applies
the law to the facts ascertained, and eventually determines whether a
patent should issue. Therefore, at first glance, any trial in which the
validity of a patent is in issue would appear to be incomplete without
testimony from the patent examiner. The explanation for this omission
of testimony is found in the traditional policy of the Patent Office.
Since 1880, the Patent Office has refused to permit members of its
staff to testify voluntarily in patent suits.4 This policy was expanded by
1. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (1960), also appearing in U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, PATENT OF-
FicE, Rides of Practice hp Patent Cases, Rule 104 (1965).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT OFFIcE, Manual of Patent Exaninding Pro-
cedure § 1701 (1965) (hereinafter referred to as MPEP).
3. 37 C.F.R. § 1.133(a) (1960).
4. Section 1701.
"Examiners Not to Express Opinion on Validity Nor Testify as Patent Ex-
perts. Inasmuch as public policy does not permit examiners to decide, as judges
in the Patent Office, questions upon which they have been retained to give
opinions as expert witnesses in patent cases in the courts, every examiner who
shall testify as an expert in a patent case pending in any court shall be dis-
missed, unless he shall have so testified involuntarily, upon compulsion by com-
petent judicial authority, and without retainer or preparation. (Basis: Notice
of March 6, 1880.)
"Congress in 35 U.S.C. 282, has endowed every patent granted by the
Patent Office with a presumption of validity. Public policy demands that every
employee of the Office refrain from expressing to any interested person any
opinion or view as to the invalidity of any U.S. Patent The question of valid-
ity or invalidity is exclusively a matter for the courts to determine. Each mem-
ber of the examining corps is cautioned to be especially wary of any inquiry
from any person outside the Patent Office (including any employee of another
government agency), the answer to which might indicate that a particular patent
should not have been issued.
"Whenever an examiner is asked or subpoenaed to testify in a suit concern-
ing a patent, trademark registration, or application for either, he is directed to
report that fact immediately to the Solicitor. (Basis: Notice, May 4, 1959.)
"Examiners are cautioned against answering inquiries from any person out-
side the Patent Office as to whether or not a certain reference was considered
and, a fortiori, whether or not a claim would have been allowed over that ref-
erence. This applies to anything in the patented file, including the extent of the
field of search and any entry relating thereto. The record of a patented file
must speak for itself. Practitioners can be of material assistance in this regard
by refraining from making such inquiries of members of the examining staff.
Answers to inquiries of this nature must of necessity be refused, and such refusal
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a 1959 amendment to Section 1701 of the Manual of Patent Examinizg
Procedure that prohibits the employees of the Patent Office from ex-
pressing any opinion as to the validity of a patent and from answering
any outside inquiries as to the scope of the search conducted in processing
a patent application.' The penalty for voluntary testimony is dismissal.6
While section 1701 does not specifically state the Commissioner of
Patents' policy where the patent examiner is subpoenaed to testify, for
the purposes of this note it will be assumed that section 1701 is indicative
of a more inclusive policy of the Patent Office opposed to all testimony
by patent examiners, and that the Commissioner of Patents will resist
any attempt to subpoena a patent examiner.'
The power of the Commissioner of Patents to prevent testimony by
the patent examiners was seriously challenged on June 16, 1966, when
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC.8 In that case the court reviewed an
order of the Federal Trade Commission holding that American Cyanamid
Company and four other major drug manufacturers' had violated Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act" in connection with the produc-
tion and sale of tetracycline, described as "currently the best selling won-
should be considered neither discourteous nor an expression of opinion as to
validity. (Basis: Notices of May 18, 1961, and October 21, 1960).
"Also, examiners are reminded that, in view of the long established policy
of the Patent Office to refuse to permit members of the staff of the Patent
Office to testiy in patent suits, they should, before allowing an application, de-
termine that the written record is accurate and complete."
5. See note 4 supra. The foreword to the MPEP states that the MPEP is "pub-
lished to provide examiners in the Patent Office with a reference work on the practice
and procedure within the Office as it relates to their duties and operations."
The MPEP is not to be confused with the Rules of Practice in Patent Cases which
is also published by the Patent Office. The provisions of the MPEP are not published
in the Code of Federal Regulations, while those of the Rules of Practice are so published.
6. No sanctions are provided for expressing opinions of validity or answering in-
quiries. See note 4 supra.
7. This assumption is supported by a letter from J. Schimmel, Patent Office So-
licitor, Feb. 24, 1967, on file at the Indiana Law Journal office.
The Patent Office does not interprete [sic] that decision [American Cy-
anamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966)] to mean that the examiner
was "required" to testify. The record of the hearing subsequent to that deci-
sion will show that the Patent Office expressly informed all parties that there
was no change in the Office policy when Mr. Lidoff was permitted to testify,
but rather that the Office considered the facts and circumstances of the case
to be so unusual and extraordinary that sufficient cause existed to consider
that case an exceptional one warranting waiver of the policy. Insofar as private
litigation is concerned the policy stands as set forth in Manual Section 1701.
8. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
9. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., Bristol-Myers Co. and Bristol Laboratories, Olin
Matheison Chemical Corporation through its E.R. Squibb & Sons Division, and the
Upjohn Company.
10. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1)(6) (1964).
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der drug in the United States."'  The FTC hearing examiner had de-
cided in favor of the drug companies on all issues and had dismissed the
complaint. The FTC reversed its hearing examiner on review, finding
that he had misconstrued information that the patent examiner had
deemed relevant to respondent Phizer Company's application for the
patent on tetracycline. The FTC decided that Phizer had deliberately
made false and misleading statements and had withheld material infor-
mation from the Patent Office in securing its tetracycline patent, and that
the effect of Phizer's conduct before the Patent Office had been to re-
strain competition and to create a monopoly in the manufacture and sale
of tetracycline in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.'
12
One of the issues before the court of appeals in reviewing the FTC's
decision was whether the patent examiner who had granted the tetracy-
cline patent should have been subpoenaed." After pointing out numerous
instances of sharp disagreement between the FTC and its hearing ex-
aminer in their findings of fact with respect to the actions of patent ex-
aminer Herbert J. Lidoff, the court posed eleven material questions, 4
not answered in the evidence, which only Examiner Lidoff could have
answered. The FTC had not called Examiner Lidoff as a witness at the
hearing, although requested by the drug companies to do so, but had
presented as a witness Manuel C. Rosa, Examiner Lidoff's superior in
the Patent Office.'5 Mr. Rosa had been unable to answer questions con-
cerning Examiner Lidoff's actions in granting the patent.
In response to the FTC argument that Section 1701 of the MPEP 8
11. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1964, § 1, p. 1, col. 1.
12. See note 10 supra. In Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the enforcement of a patent
procured by fraud on the Patent Office may violate § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1964), provided all other elements of a § 2 monopolization charge are proved, in
which event the treble-damage provision of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1964), would be available to the injured party.
13. The major issue before the court was whether, under the facts and circum-
stances of the case, the participation of FTC Chairman Dixon in the hearing amounted
to a denial of due process. Chairman Dixon had earlier served as counsel for a legis-
lative committee investigation involving the same facts and issues concerning the same
parties named as respondents before the FTC. The depth of that investigation, and the
questions and comments made by Mr. Dixon as counsel indicated to the court that his
participation in the FTC hearing was a denial of due process to the drug companies.
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
14. American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 777-78 (6th Cir. 1966). The
ultimate questions possed were, "did Lidoff receive all the information that he requested
from Pfizer? And was Lidoff misled and deceived by Pfizer and Cyanamid and did
he grant the tetracycline patent as the result of such deception?"
15. The drug companies did not seek to subpoena Examiner Lidoff as their wit-
ness because they had been denied an opportunity to interview him in advance of his
testimony.
16. See note 4 supra.
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prevented Examiner Lidoff from being called to testify, the court stated,
"we see no reason why Examiner Lidoff could not have been subpoenaed
as a witness to testify as to facts known only to him with respect to ma-
terial issues of great public interest in this proceeding."'" Ultimately, the
court held that in the absence of testimony from Examiner Lidoff the
FTC's decision on the issue of misrepresentation to the Patent Office
was not supported by substantial evidence.
The court's decision brings into issue the validity of the policy of
the Commissioner of Patents as evidenced in section 1701 and impliedly
raises the question of whether a fundamental privilege underlies that
policy. This note will examine the legal bases upon which the Commis-
sioner of Patents might rely in contesting the validity of the effect of
a subpoena issued to a patent examiner.
Under Section 1701 of the MPEP
Section 1701, which is similar to regulations of other administrative
agencies" that preclude production of department records or information
by subordinates, has two possible statutory bases. Before 1958, the Gov-
ernment usually argued that such regulations were authorized by 5 U.S.C.
§ 22.19 But in 1958, Congress added an amendment to that section, stat-
ing that, "this section does not authorize withholding information from
the public or limiting the availability of records to the public."2'  There-
fore 5 U.S.C. § 22, as amended, does not authorize the Commissioner of
Patents to prevent patent examiners from giving testimony under
subpoena.21
The second statutory basis from which the Commissioner of Patents
derives his authority to establish regulations is 35 U.S.C. § 6, which
states that "He [the Commissioner of Patents] may, subject to the ap-
17. American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 779 (6th Cir. 1966). The court
of appeals is authorized to order the FTC to take additional evidence by 38 Stat. 719
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964). The subpoena power of the FTC is provided in 38
Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964).
18. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice Order No. 3229, 11 Fed. Reg. 4920, filed May 2, 1946,
and Supp. No. 2 to that order, filed June 6, 1947, dealing with a subpoena duces tecum
issued to a subordinate.
19. "The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not in-
consistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers
and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and
preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it." Rav. STAT. § 161
(1875). This provision has been revised and enacted into positive law as 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 301 (1966).
20. 72 Stat. 547 (1958), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). This provision has been revised
and enacted into positive law as 5 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1966).
Concerning the reliance of administrative agencies on 5 U.S.C. § 22 to preclude giv-
ing of testimony by administrative employees before the 1958 amendment, see Leg. Hist.
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3389 (1958).
21. See NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 1961).
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proval of the Secretary of Commerce, establish regulations, not inconsis-
tent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent Office."2 It
would appear that this section does not apply to proceedings outside the
Patent Office, and that it does not authorize the Commissioner of Pat-
ents to issue regulations that in effect change the rules of evidence in
courts. Since the apparent effect of the more inclusive policy of Section
1701 of the MPEP is to limit the evidence available and the witnesses
who can be effectively subpoenaed in a patent suit, it is more than a regu-
lation "for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent Office" and is there-
fore beyond the statutory delegation of authority. This logic is sup-
ported by a case decided in 1890 by the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York." The court was confronted by a rule of the
Patent Office, established under Rev. Stat. § 483 (1875),24 that required
that caveats and pending applications be held in secrecy. The Patent Of-
fice contended that caveats and pending applications were privileged
documents. The court, however, held the rule to be
: * * inoperative to change the rules of evidence in courts of
justice, both because to that extent it [the rule] would be in-
consistent with law, and also because the effecting of such a
change [by the rule] is in no sense the regulation of proceedings
in the Patent Office.2"
Therefore, there appears to be no express statutory basis either in
the Patent Act or the Administrative Procedure Act for or against the
policy of the Commissioner of Patents against allowing patent examiners
to testify.2 6
Question of Privilege
Because there is no explicit statutory basis for the policy of the Com-
missioner of Patents, its justification may ultimately rest on a claim of
governmental privilege against production of information. Government
22. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1964) (emphasis added).
23. Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United States Elec. Lighting Co., 44 Fed. 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1890).
24. RFv. STAT. § 483 (1875) has been recodified, in the same words, as 35 U.S.C.
§ 6 (1964).
25. Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United States Elec. Lighting Co., 44 Fed. 294, 299
(S.D.N.Y. 1890) (emphasis added).
26. The validity of J 1701 of the MPEP should not be affected by the recent
amendment to the Public Information Act, codified and enacted into positive law as 5
U.S.C.A. § 552 (1966), which requires that "administrative staff manuals and instruc-
tions to staff that affect any member of the public" be "promptly published and copies




claims for special evidentiary privileges fall into four general categories :21
(1) an informer's privilege;8 (2) a privilege for military, state, or dip-
lomatic secrets ;29 (3) specific statutory privileges;8" and, (4) a general
housekeeping privilege."' Clearly, a claim of privilege against a patent
examiner testifying must fall within the last category, if any.
United States v. Reynolds"2 is the most pertinent case on the question
of governmental housekeeping privilege and particularly on whether the
government agency or the court should determine the existence of a
privilege. In that case widows of three civilian observers sued the United
States under the Tort Claims Act 3 for the deaths of their husbands in
the crash of an airplane that carried secret electronic equipment. The
plaintiffs moved under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'
for production of the Air Force's official accident investigation report.
The Secretary of the Air Force resisted discovery in a letter to the dis-
trict judge and in a formal claim of privilege supported by an affidavit
from the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force. The District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered production of the docu-
ment in camera so that the court could determine whether it contained
privileged matter. The Government filed an interlocutory appeal from
the production order to the court of appeals 5 wherein the Government
claimed two privileges: (1) the general housekeeping privilege author-
ized by 5 U.S.C. § 22; and (2) the privilege against production of docu-
ments containing military secrets.
On the claim of a housekeeping privilege the court of appeals stated:
We regard the recognition of such a sweeping privilege
against any disclosures of the internal operations of the execu-
tive departments of the government as contrary to a sound pub-
lic policy. The present cases themselves indicate the breadth of
the claim of immunity from disclosure which one government
27. Asbill & Snell, Scope of Discovery Against the United States, 7 VAND. L. REv.
582, 584 (1954).
28. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374(f) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
29. Id. at 2378(g).
30. E.g., the qualified privilege for income tax returns. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6103.
31. Cases illustrating the wide range of positions the courts have taken on a claim
of the housekeeping privilege are collected in Asbill & Snell, supra note 26, at 590.
Wigmore appears to be strongly opposed to the use of a general housekeeping priv-
ilege. "The responsibility of officials to explain and to justify their acts is the chief
safeguard against oppression and corruption." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378(g) (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961).
32. 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
33. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 (1964).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (1964) applies only to documents which are not privileged.
35. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 996 (3d Cir. 1951).
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head has already made. It is but a small step to assert a privi-
lege against disclosure of records merely because they might
prove embarrassing to government officers. Indeed it requires
no great flight of imagination to realize that if the govern-
ment's contentions in these cases were affirmed the privilege
against disclosure might gradually be enlarged by executive
determinations until, as is the case in some nations today, it
embraced the whole range of governmental activities. 6
The court of appeals thus denied the authority of a head of a government
department to make a binding determination that a housekeeping privi-
lege exists." On the claim of a military secrets privilege the court of
appeals affirmed the district court order requiring the document to be
produced in camera."
In NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co." an employer defending an unfair la-
bor practice charge sought to subpoena an attorney from the NLRB
General Counsel's office who had investigated the charge for the pur-
pose of discrediting certain pre-trial affidavits and written statements
that the investigating attorney had elicited from employees. The em-
ployer contended that the employees' affidavits and statements were false
because the attorney had elicited them by playing on the employees' sym-
pathy for a discharged fellow employee and his family. The General
Counsel of the NLRB refused to grant permission for the attorney to
testify. The NLRB trial examiner therefore quashed a subpoena issued
to the attorney, relying on an NLRB regulation that prohibited Board
employees from testifying in any cause before a court or the Board with-
out the wriften consent of the Board or the General Counsel.4" The regu-
36. 192 F.2d 987, 995 (1951) (emphasis added). The court quoted the words of
Patrick Henry that, "to cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine of business,
is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man and friend to his country." 3
ELLIOTT'S DEBATES 170 (1836 ed.).
37. The court of appeals recognized that Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900),
and United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), did not apply. In both
of those cases a subordinate government employee, cited for contempt for refusing to
produce subpoenaed documents, pleaded a regulation, issued under 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964),
forbidding the production of documents by subordinates without approval of the depart-
ment head. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the employees to refuse to pro-
duce subpoenaed documents under those circumstances. Neither case reached the issue
of whether the head of a department has an absolute privilege to refuse to produce sub-
poenaed documents or information.
38. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the documents
was within the military secrets privilege and need not be produced in camera. 345 U.S.
1, 6-7 (1953). It may be significant that the Supreme Court did not reverse the court
of appeals holding that no broad housekeeping privilege exists.
39. 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961).
40. NLRB Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1963). This regulation is similar to
§ 1701 of the MPEP.
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lation had been issued under the purported authority of 5 U.S.C. § 22"'
In holding that the subpoena was erroneously quashed by the trial
examiner the fifth circuit court of appeals held: (1) that no special
characteristics of an administrative hearing justify the exclusion of evi-
dence which would be error to exclude in a court trial ;42 (2) that the
enactment of the 1958 amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 22 indicates that the
statute itself did not create a privilege;4 (3) that the determination of
a question of privilege is the proper function of a court and not of the
department head; and (4) that the absence of service of process on the
department head does not preclude a court from determining whether
information withheld by a subordinate is privileged, i.e., that the depart-
ment head need not be a party before a court can decide the question of
privilege.4"
The opinions in Reynolds and Capitol Fish. Co. indicate that the
Commissioner of Patents does not have the authority to determine fi-
nally the existence of a housekeeping privilege concerning patent ex-
aminers. Rather, the question whether a privilege exists is to be deter-
mined by the courts. Only if substantial reasons are advanced by the
Commissioner of Patents for refusing to permit a patent examiner to
testify in a particular case and the probative value of the patent ex-
aminer's testimony appear to be slight,45 will a court find a valid claim
of privilege.
41. See note 19 supra.
42. The refusal to subpoena a patent examiner held unjustifiable in American Cy-
anamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), occurred during an FTC administra-
tive hearing.
43. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
44. The court in Capitol Fish Co. stated that United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen,
340 U.S. 462 (1951), discussed in note 37 supra, could possibly be read as "precluding
judicial determination of the non-existence of a privilege or its waiver when a regula-
tion reserves to a department head authority to release official papers and the head has
not been served by process." NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 874 (5th Cir.
1961). In Touhy, the department head was not served and the Court did not reach the
issue of whether there was a valid privilege. The court in Capitol Fish Co. noted, how-
ever, that in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), discussed in note 38 supra,
the Supreme Court did consider the substantive merits of the alleged privilege, though
the department head in that case evidently had not been served by process. "Although
the Reynolds decision, decided two years after Ragen, does not expressly conflict with
the latter, it does seem to overrule the suggestion in Ragen that the lack of service of
process over the department head prevents a court from deciding whether evidence
withheld by a subordinate is privileged." NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., supra at 874.
Capitol Fish Co. also implies that the use of a subpoena ad testificandum rather than
a subpoena duces tecum, used in the cases discussed thus far, should create no effective
difference to the question of determination of privilege.
45. See discussion of the necessity for production of documents claimed to be with-
in the military secrets privilege in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
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Possible Limitations of American Cyanamid v. FTC
Since the statutes are silent and the cases indicate no government
privilege to the contrary, any limitations on the holdings of American Cy-
ananmid Co. 6 that a patent examiner may be required to testify in some
circumstances must necessarily be based on the special facts of that case
or on some special immunity from subsequent inquiry into the patent
examiner's decisional process.
American Cyanamid Co. involved a patent of tremendous national
significance that permitted monopolization of the manufacture and sale
of a proven "wonder drug" selling in high volume." The court of ap-
peals recognized the significance of the tetracycline patent.4" Undoubtedly
the substantial public interest in a patent so significantly affecting the
general welfare affects the judicial determination of whether a privilege
exists. In making that determination the court's function is to balance
the benefits that will accrue to the public through proper operation of
the Patent Office if the information is excluded against the benefits that
will accrue to the public if that information is admitted into evidence.49
The public has an interest in the efficiency of administrative agencies,
but it has as great an interest in extending substantial justice to litigants
in a court or administrative proceeding."0 Thus in a case involving a
patent of less public importance than that in American Cyanamid Co., a
court might weigh the public interest in securing the patent examiner's
testimony less heavily than did the sixth circuit."'
Since the existence of fraud on the Patent Office was the principle
issue in dispute in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, the courts might
limit its holding to those cases involving issues of fraud on the Patent
46. 363 F.2d 757, 779 (6th Cir. 1966).
47. See note 11 supra.
48. "In the present case the Commission was not dealing with a patent on an ordi-
nary item of commerce, but with patents on antibiotics of vital importance in the treat-
ment and cure of many diseases and of tremendous impact upon the public health."
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 771 (6th Cir. 1966). "We see no reason
why Examiner Lidoff could not have been subpoenaed as a witness to testify as to facts
known only to him with respect to material issues of great public interest in this pro-
ceeding." Id. at 779 (emphasis added).
49. See also Berger & Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J.
1451, 1462-64 (1950).
50. "It is urged, to be sure . . .that the 'public interest must be considered para-
mount to the individual interest of a suitor in a court of justice.' As if the public in-
terest were not involved in the administration of justice! As if the denial of justice
to a single suitor were not as much a public injury as is the disclosure of any official
record! When justice is at stake, the appeal to the necessities of the public interest on
the other side is of no superior weight." 8 WIGMORE, EvInENcE § 2378(g) n.7 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961).
51. The public policy supporting § 1701 of the MPEP is discussed in the text ac-
companying note 88 sapra.
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Office. There are two situations where the patent examiner's testimony
is most likely to be requested: (1) where the party denying the validity
of a patent alleges fraud on the Patent Office by the patentee, and (2)
where the party denying the validity of a patent maintains that the inven-
tion was unpatentable over some relevant prior art which the patent ex-
aminer improperly considered or failed to consider when granting the
patent.
52
An allegation of fraud on the Patent Office by an applicant is an
extremely serious charge which, if proven, will render a patent invalid.53
An allegation of fraud in effect deprives a court of the opportunity to
rely on the Patent Office's determination of patentability. Since the
Patent Office allegedly has been deceived by misrepresentation, the pre-
sumption of validity attaching to the patent54 loses weight.5 One of the
52. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the inven-
tion thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(d) the invention was patented or caused to be patented by the applicant or his
legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of appli-
cation for patent in this country on an application filed more than twelve
months before the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent
by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the appli-
cant for patent, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed or concealed it.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964) :
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
closed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the in-
vention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.
53. Abington Textile Mach. Works v. Carding Specialists (Canada) Ltd., 249 F.
Supp. 823, 839 (D.D.C. 1965). "A charge of misrepresentations to the Patent Office
by an applicant for a patent is a serious allegation, and should be investigated by a
Court even where, as here, the accused infringer does not press the charge initially
made."
54. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. I, 1965).
55. In Coming Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461,
471 (D. Del. 1966), an infringement action in which the defendant alleged that the
plaintiff's patent was unenforceable because it was obtained by fraud, the court stated
that: "Once intentional misrepresentations are involved, the court has the burden of de-
termining whether or not the misrepresentations were relied upon by the examiner and
whether, absent such reliance, the patent should have issued. In effect, the court is de-
prived of the benefit of the Patent Office's expertise in making th initial findings con-
cerning patentability. Enforcing a patent in behalf of one who has made intentional
misrepresentations to the Patent Office, irrespective of the merits of his patent applica-
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elements of common law fraud is reliance by the victim on a material mis-
representation, but there seems to be no dependable way to determine
whether a patent examiner relied on a misrpresntation except by examin-
ing him." If fraud is alleged, as in American Cyanamid Co., the patent
examiner's testimony will be useful in determining whether there was a
material misrepresentation 7 and whether the patent examiner relied on
this misrepresentation in granting the patent. 8
When the defendant in an infringement suit alleges that the inven-
tion was unpatentable over some relevant prior art that the patent ex-
aminer improperly considered or failed to consider when granting the
patent," the reason for requiring the patent examiner to testify is weaker.
The court proceeding in an action contesting the validity of a patent is a
de novo proceeding,"0 and after hearing testimony on both sides, the judge
determines whether the patent is valid."' Testimony by the patent ex-
aminer who granted the patent would be of the same general character as
other expert testimony. Moreover, the patent examiner would have no
peculiar knowledge or information as he probably would have where there
is an allegation of fraud on the Patent Office. 2 Where fraud is alleged
tion, might encourage an applicant to be dishonest in dealing with the Patent Office,
thus preventing the office from functioning properly."
56. A patent examiner is not required to write an opinion (thus expressing his re-
liances) unless there is an initial or a final rejection of a patent application. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.106(b) (1960).
57. Courts use varying standards in determining materiality of a misrepresentation.
The court in Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Supply Co., 169 F.
Supp. 1, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1958), stated that a misrepresentation is material if, but for the
misrepresentations the patent would not have issued. In Corning Glass Works v. An-
chor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966), where the defense was lack
of clean hands on the part of the plaintiff, a misrepresentation was held to be material
if it was "relevant" and "significant" to the issuance of the patent.
58. If the allegedly fraudulently obtained patent was issued under direction of the
Patent Office Board of Appeals, under 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1964), rather than by a patent
examiner, it may be necessary to elicit testimony on the question of reliance from each
member of the Board of Appeals participating in the issuance. There appears to be no
reason why members of the Board of Appeals should be any more immune from sub-
poena than the primary patent examiners.
59. See note 52 supra.
60. For example, an infringement suit, under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1964) as amended,
35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. I, 1965).
61. In determining whether the patent is enforceable at the time of litigation, the
judge must of necessity make a prior determination of whether the patent was valid,
over objections of lack of novelty or any other, at the time of issuance. In effect, the
judge, supported -by expert testimony, takes the place of a patent examiner. Of course
the presumption of validity attaching to a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. 1, 1965)
must be considered by the judge in making his determination.
62. Whether the examiner would have issued the patent had he known of the prior
art brought to light for the first time in the litigation is irrelevant since it is a de novo
hearing and the judge is now the final arbiter of the validity of the patent. Testimony
as to whether the patent should have issued in view of all the prior art (whether cited
at the time the patent issued or first brought to light in the litigation) is available from
expert witnesses knowledgeable in the area.
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the patent examiner would be the only person with knowledge of the
particular facts he relied upon in granting the patent. In those situations
where fraud is not alleged, a court might well find that the Patent Of-
fice's policy against testimony by patent examiners is more important
than the advantages of obtaining the patent examiner's testimony.
A final possible limitation on American Cyanamid Co. is suggested
by the fact that the Government was the plaintiff. Some cases have held
that when the Government moves against a citizen as a plaintiff it cannot
assert its evidentiary privileges.6" The theory is that it contradicts basic
principles of fairness for the Government to appear as plaintiff with a
sword of destruction in one hand and a shield of protection in the other.
However, it does not follow that the Patent Office waives a privilege
it might have because the FTC or any other federal agency institutes pro-
ceedings against a citizen.64
To disallow a claim of privilege by the Patent Office where the FTC
or other federal agency institutes a proceeding would allow one adminis-
trative agency to circumvent the internal policy of the Patent Office and
restrict the congressional grant of authority to the Commissioner of Pat-
ents to superintend the execution of the purposes of the Patent Act. Ad-
ministrative agencies should not have such power over their sister agen-
cies without a grant of authority from Congress.
63. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Court held that the de-
fense in a federal criminal prosecution was entitled as a matter of right, without laying
a prior foundation and without prior judicial determination of impeachment value, to an
order directing the Government to produce for inspection by the defense all statements
of the witnesses in that prosecution in its possession, written or recorded by the FBI,
touching the events and activities to which the witnesses had testified. The so-called
Jencks legislation, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), limiting somewhat the Jeneks holding, was
construed in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). For a more complete dis-
cussion in the criminal area see Forgotson, The Jencks Legislation: The Status of the
Accused's Discovery Rights, 38 TEx. L. Rxv. 595 (1960) ; The JTencks Legislation: Prob-
lemis in Prospect, 67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958).
In the civil area, see Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). In Flem-
ing v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624, 625-26 (N.D. Ohio 1941), the court stated that a govern-
ment officer who brings suit "must be held to have waived any privilege, which he
might otherwise have had, to withhold testimony. . . . He must either give up his
privilege to withhold pertinent evidence or he must abandon his suit for relief. The
court granted the defendant a requested interrogatory to the Administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and supported its holding by stating that the interrogatory did not seek
government files or records, but only information within the knowledge of the plaintiff.
Such personal knowledge would also be the object of a subpoena of a patent examiner.
64. The court in Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), however, stated that: "The several departments are all agencies of one govern-
ment, possessed, theoretically, at least, of a single will. When that will is exercised in
favor of litigating its claims it is thereby exercised in favor of surrendering the con-
ditional privilege of suppressing its household secrets ..
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Probing the Mental Processes of an Administrative Official
The Patent Office might argue 5 that allowing a patent examiner to
be subpoenaed would open the mental processes of an administrative of-
ficial to judcial scrutiny. In United States v. Morgan,"0 which involved
the validity of the Secretary of Agriculture's order fixing maximum rates
for the Kansas City Stockyards marketing agencies, the Supreme Court
held that it was not the function of the federal district court to "probe
the mental processes" of the Secretary in fixing the rates.
Admittedly, determining whether a fraudulent misrepresentation
was made to a patent examiner and whether he relied on it in granting a
patent would involve some probing of his mental processes. However,
the nature of the testimony sought in Morgan is distinguishable from the
nature of the testimony a patent examiner might give in several respects.
First, in Morgan the Secretary of Agriculture had fixed the agency
rates after considering thousands of pages of evidence compiled during
Department of Agriculture hearings over several years."7 Under these
circumstances the Supreme Court held that it was improper for the dis-
trict court to examine the Secretary concerning the basis of his rate de-
cision. 8 But in a patent case where fraud is alleged, the patent examiner
will not be asked why he granted a patent but only whether a misrepre-
sentation was made to him and whether he relied on that misrepresenta-
tion in granting a patent. Hence, the range of the court's probe of the
patent examiner's mental processes will be considerably narrower than
the range of the probe of the Secretary's mental processes in the Morgan
case.
09
Second, the Court in Morgan stated that the proceedings before the
Secretary of Agriculture resembled judicial proceedings because many
interested parties introduced evidence during the Department's hearings,
and that an examination of the mental processes of a judge would be de-
structive of judicial responsibility."0 The proceeding before the patent
examiner, however, is not of the same character as the proceedings in
65. Letter from J. Schimmel, Patent Office Solicitor, Feb. 24, 1967, on file at the
Indiana Law Journal office.
66. 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
67. Id. at 420.
68. "He [the Secretary] was questioned at length regarding the process by which
he reached the conclusions of his order, including the manner and extent of his study of
the record and his consultations with subordinates." Id. at 422.
69. Where the only issue in the case is patentability over the relevant prior art,
any questions probing the examiner's mental process in arriving at a decision of patent-
ability would be closer to the Morgan situation. In this case the courts may will find
Morgan controlling and deny the litigants the opportunity to examine the patent ex-
aminer. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
70. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
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Morgan. The patent applicant is the only party presenting evidence, and
the patent examiner acts as both the adversary and the judge of patent-
ability. As such, the ex parte action is of questionable judicial character.
Finally, the Secretary of Agriculture is the head of a huge adminis-
trative agency, a position that requires the constant exercise of discretion
and judgment. If the Secretary were open to judicial probing of his
mental processes, the whole functioning of the Department of Agricul-
ture would become bogged down as a result of suits filed by aggrieved
or vindictive parties. This problem does not arise, however, where the
patent examiner is required to testify. Such examination can do little to
impede the operation of the Patent Office since the testifying patent ex-
aminer is only one of many patent examiners performing similar duties.
At most the backlog of the Patent Office would be increased, but the
administration of the Patent Office by the Commissioner of Patents
would remain unencumbered.
Therefore, the logic of the Morgan case should not be applied as an
absolute prohibition to examination of a patent examiner. Morgan in-
volved a unique administrative proceeding and should not be indiscrimin-
ately applied to other administrative proceedings. 7
Policy Basis for Subpoenaing a Patent Examiner
As discussed earlier,"2 in the final determination of the existence of
a privilege precluding a patent examiner's testimony, a judge73 must
weigh the public interest on each side of the question, 4 and base his de-
termination on public policy. The proper balancing of these interests
71. In Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 1964),
Singer had asked the NLRB trial examiner to subpoena an NLRB field examiner.
Singer alleged that the Board in determining an appropriate bargaining unit had vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and sought to question the field examiner as to
the part he played in the determination. The trial examiner refused to subpoena the
field examiner, basing his refusal on the NLRB regulation discussed in the text accom-
panying note 39 supra, and on the mental processes rule. The court held that the NLRB
should have subpoenaed the field examiner, stating at p. 207, "We do not construe the
language of this so-called fourth Morgan case as proscribing, under all circumstances,
the probing of mental processes, United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 421-422." In the
court's view, "the mental processes rule is but 'one facet of the general presumption of
regularity' which attaches to decisions of administrative bodies. Thus, we conclude,
where a prima facie case of misconduct is shown, justice requires that the mental pro-
cess rule be held inapplicable."
72. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
73. See note 17 supra on the subpoena power of the FTC. "Any person, partner-
ship, or corporation required by an order of the Commission [FTC] to cease and desist
from using any method of competition or act or practice may obtain a review of such
an order in the court of appeals of the United States . . .by filing in the court, within
sixty days from the date of service of such order, a written petition praying that the
order of the Commission be set aside." 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964).
74. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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requires that the rationale and objectives underlying Section 1701 of the
MPEP be discovered and appraised.
Although the Commissioner of Patents has not stated the purposes
of section 1701, one of its objectives may be to keep patent examiners at
work in Washington, D. C., rather than travelling around the country
testifying in patent suits."5 This would be, in fact, a valid reason for re-
fusing to permit a patent examiner to testify since the Patent Office is
laboring under a tremendous backlog. A patent examiner shortage could
cause the backlog to increase or could force the Patent Office to hire ad-
ditional patent examiners at additional expense to the public. But even
though an extension of this backlog could cause serious problems, the
backlog is essentially an administrative problem. It should not be too
great a burden for a public interested in preventing the enforcement of
fraudulently obtained patents." To avoid wasting the patent examiners'
time the testimony of an examiner could be taken in Washington, D. C.,
by deposition under Rules 26-31 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure."' Abuse of such a practice could be prevented by strict applica-
tion by the courts of Rules 30(b) and (d) that protect the deponent from
examination in bad faith or "insuch manner as unreasonably to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the deponent."7
A second reason for the policy of Section 1701 of the MPEP may
lie in its provision that, "the record of a patented file must speak for it-
self." Permitting the patent examiner to testify as to his reliances in
granting a patent would lessen the reliability of the patent files because
his reliances are not stated in the file and could be determined only by
his testimony. These files are made public so that prospective manufac-
75. Patent infringement suits may be filed and litigated in every federal district
court in the country. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338, 1400 (1964).
76. "A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. . . . It is an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and
open market. The far reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore,
give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from back-
grounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept
within their legitimate scope." Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Mainte-
nance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
77. In Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Airline, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1951), the court held that a court could compel a Civil Aeronautics Board inspector to
testify to facts observed by him in his official capacity, either by deposition or in person.
The CAB disclaimed any objection to such testimony, distinguishing between facts
within the knowledge of the inspector and the Board's reports, orders or files.
The scope of the examination of a deponent permitted under the Federal Rules
specifically excludes privileged matter, thus referring one back to a determination of
privilege.
78. It has been suggested that Rules 30(b) and (d) form a better basis than privi-
lege for protecting the government from disclosure in any case. Pike & Fischer,
Discovery Against Federal Administrative Agencies, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1125, 1134-36
(1943).
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turers and inventors can determine what they can do without infringing
a patent. Nonetheless, the courts would probably find a greater public
interest in obtaining evidence of fraudulent procurement than in protect-
ing the reliability of the patent files, thereby protecting the monopoly of
one who might have obtained his patent through fraudulent misrepre-
sentation.
The Commissioner of Patents has a valid and substantial interest in
protecting the good name of the Patent Office in order to engender pub-
lic confidence and reliance. Yet the Patent Office realistically need not
have a fear of injury to its good name from a patent examiner's testi-
mony that he relied on a misrepresentation in granting a patent. The
Patent Office has no laboratories of its own, and frequently the patent
examiner must rely on affidavits submitted by applicants on the technical
properties of an invention. 9 Therefore the Patent Office is in no posi-
tion to determine when fraudulent misrepresentations are made. More-
over, there is a more basic public interest in preventing the enforcement
of fraudulently acquired patents than there is in protecting the Patent
Office from embarrassment. By allowing subpoena of patent examiners,
thereby making the proof of fraud on the Patent Office easier for private
litigants, future fraudulent conduct would be discouraged and the possi-
bility of future embarrassment of the Patent Office would be reduced.
Another possible reason for the policy of Section 1701 is that the
patent examiner's memory of his reliances in granting a patent may be
imperfect and the value of his testimony may be slight" if he were called
to testify many years after he granted the patent. However, such reason-
ing is faulty for several reasons. The interval between the issuance of
the patent and the litigation will vary in each case, as will the patent ex-
aminer's recollection of his reliances. The probative value of the patent
examiner's testimony is for the court to judge after hearing the testi-
mony.81 Lack of probative value is a basis for exclusion of evidence; it
79. This was the case in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.
1966).
80. Part of Examiner Herbert Lidoff's testimony before the FTC in American
Cyanamid Co., after the remand by the court of appeals, is reported in 28 Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Reports No. 38, Sept. 19, 1966, pp. 11-16. Mr. Werner Kutz and Dr.
Francis Murphy are Pfizer & Co.'s patent representatives who met with Examiner
Lidoff in 1954 to discuss with him objections he had raised to the issuance of a patent
on tetracycline. Cross-examination by Pfizer's counsel:
Q. Excuse me, Mr. Lidoff-is that what you said to Mr. Kutz and Dr. Murphy?
A. I have no notion of what I said to them.
Q. You can't even remember a single statement that you made?
A. Not one single word.
81. "However halting its progress, the trend in litigation is toward a rational in-
quiry into truth, in which the tribunal considers everything 'logically probative of some
270
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is not a basis for an evidentiary privilege."
A patent applicant is required to file a complete written statement of
the reasons warranting favorable action which he presented at an inter-
view with the patent examiner.8 3 Therefore, a fifth possible reason for
Section 1701 might be the argument that the filing of such a statement
by the applicant should estop him from later calling the patent examiner
to testify against an allegation of fraud. If the record of the representa-
tions made by the applicant is incomplete or inaccurate, it is the fault of
the applicant himself. But, in Examiner Lidoff's testimony before the
FTC8 4 in American Cyanamid Co. he denied that these explanatory
memos placed in official patent files by applicants or their counsel have
any significance, and he said that frequently he did not even bother to
read these memos carefully. Statements held in such low esteem by a
patent examiner should not later be afforded sufficient dignity to estop
the patentee from calling the examiner to testify against an allegation
of fraud.
A general argument against the policy of section 1701 is that per-
mitting a defendant in an infringement suit to have the patent examiner
subpoenaed may strengthen the only effective method of eradicating
fraudulently obtained patents. As a practical matter, our patent system
leaves the task of detecting and eradicating fraudulently obtained patents
to the alleged infringer in an infringement suit or to an interested party
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action. Other remedies, either before
or after issuance of a patent, are ineffective.85 Successful defense of a
vigorously pursued infringement suit is quite difficult because the al-
leged infringer must rebut the presumption of validity of the patent.8
Also, the extremely high cost of litigation acts as a deterrent to contesting
matter requiring to be proved."' Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 497
(1951).
82. The Patent Office itself recognizes that at times the evidence of a patent ex-
aminer will be of value to a court. In United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155
F. Supp. 949, 952 (D. Mass. 1957), a government suit to cancel a patent on the ground
that prior publication in the art was not cited by the applicant in his specifications, the
Government submitted an affidavit of the Patent Office's assistant examiner who had
been present at a conference with the applicant's attorney. The affidavit stated that the
examiner did not recall having been shown a copy of a thesis which allegedly contained
the prior publication, nor did he recall any discussion at the conference of the work of
others than the applicant.
An affidavit, unlike personal testimony or a deposition, does not give notice to the
opposing party so that he may attend and cross-examine. It would therefore be in-
admissable hearsay evidence unless admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule,
and such an affidavit does not appear to be within any of the recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule.
83. 37 C.F.R. § 1.133(b) (1966).
84. See note 80 supra.
85. Note, 77 H'Av. L. REv. 1505, 1507-11 (1966).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. I, 1965).
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the validity of a patent. Consequently, an invalid patent might continue
in effect without challenge.87 Giving the defendant in an infringement
suit access to the testimony of the patent examiner may ease his burden
considerably.
Conclusion
The sole reason for a court's upholding a housekeeping privilege is
that the public interest requires that documents or testimony be withheld
from evidence."8 In the patent area the determination that a court must
make is which of two groups of competing interests is superior. Within
one group are the public interests in maintaining the good reputation, in-
tegrity, and effectiveness of the Patent Office, and in supporting the
well-considered policies of the Commissioner of Patents in whom the
public has placed full responsibility for administering our patent system.
In the competing group are two primary public interests. The first is to
assure that only monopolies created by honestly procured patents encum-
ber the public. The second is to guarantee litigants access to that evi-
dence which justice requires they have.
The primary question is to what extent these two interests are co-
incident. The answer to this question can come only from a court after
it has balanced all the interests involved under the facts and circum-
stances of each case. The policy of the commissioner, as evidenced by
Section 1701 of the MPEP, unwarrantedly deprives a court of its proper
function of balancing all of the interests bearing on a determination of
privilege and entrusts that determination solely and finally to the agency
asserting the privilege.
As Professor Morgan states, in discussing privilege:
So serious an interference with rational inquiry can be justified
only by accompanying social benefits of great worth. . . . If a
privilege to suppress the truth is to be recognized at all, its
limits should be sharply determined so as to coincide with the
limits of the benefits it creates. In many decisions this prin-
ciple is disregarded. Sentiment serves for justice, and rhetoric
is substituted for reason.89
87. "Issued patents, whether valid or not, may have a high nuisance value in the
hands of large corporate owners, since they can wreak financial havoc upon smaller com-
petitors by infringement suits, even though the ultimate judgment is in favor of the
infringer." S. REP. No. 1464, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1956).
88. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2378(g) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
89. Foreword to the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 7 (1942).
